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Abstract 
 
In this paper we argue that the primary issue in Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, Part 
II, articles 1-40, is the problem of individuating bodies. We demonstrate that  
Descartes departs from the traditional quest for a principle of individuation, moving 
to a different strategy with the more modest aim of constructing bodies adequate to 
the needs of his cosmology. In doing this he meets with a series of difficulties, and 
this is precisely the challenge that Newton took up. We show that Descartes’ 
questions and his strategy influenced not only Newton’s account of physical bodies, 
but also the structure of his mechanics. 
 
 
1. The ‘dissolution of bodies’ 
 
One important part of the conceptual change that took place in the seventeenth 
century has been successfully labelled the ‘dissolution of the Aristotelian cosmos’.1 
This is not all that was dissolved. A deeper challenge is what we will call the 
dissolution of physical bodies. Having rejected the traditional Aristotelian resources 
of prime matter, form, and so forth, seventeenth century natural philosophers had then 
to find new answers old questions, such as ‘What is the nature of physical bodies?’ 
and ‘What distinguishes this body from the surrounding uniform, homogeneous 
                                                          
1 Koyre (1957). 
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matter?’. In addition, the new sceptical trend gave rise to additional metaphysical 
questions, such as ‘Do physical bodies (or indeed physical reality) exist at all?’, along 
with various epistemological counterparts, such as ‘How do I know the nature of 
physical bodies?’, or ‘How do I know that physical bodies (or physical reality itself) 
exist?’, and ‘How can I distinguish one individual body from another or from all the 
rest (especially if we consider the unreliability of the senses)?’.  
 
A new account of physical bodies was needed, and there were two main suggestions: 
physical bodies are either specific aggregates of material particles, or shapes cut in a 
continuous matter. However, both suggestions face problems: in the former case, 
given the principle of the uniformity of matter, it is unclear what makes the particles 
stick together; in the latter case it is equally unclear what distinguishes one body from 
all the other bodies around it. Moreover, given the passivity of matter in the ‘new’ 
philosophy, no source of activity is left in the material world to account for the 
interaction between its physical parts.2 Thus, in each case it is far from obvious what 
individuates a body, giving it unity and distinguishing it from the rest of the material 
universe. In this way, the problem of the dissolution of physical bodies leads directly 
to one of the traditional problems of metaphysics: the problem of individuation.3  
Matter as an actual, infinite and homogeneous substratum is no longer able to play its 
traditional role of a principle of individuation (just as forms are no longer the 
principle of intelligibility), and a new principle of individuation is needed.4 In 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Hutchinson (1983). 
3 By individuation in this context we mean both the ‘principle of individuation’, by which an individual 
is uniquely picked out (at an instant), and the problem of the identity of that individual over time. 
‘Individuation’ in seventeenth century philosophy often meant quite different things (see especially 
Thiel, 1998). By the problem of individuation we understand a complex of questions bearing the two 
issues of individuation at an instant and identity over time. Although there is fairly general agreement 
in the recent literature concerning what is meant by this problem, some aspects of the debate are 
perhaps less familiar. See for example Des Chene (1996) pp. 367-371, who distinguishes between 
‘static individuation’ and ‘dynamic individuation’ in Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy. 
4 A similar problem undermines the individuation of human beings. If man is an “aggregate” of soul 
and matter, what makes him different with respect with any other such aggregate, or even with respect 
with other parts of matter, or other spiritual beings? Moreover, if what is “individual” is the human 
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response, new entities were added – the void and active principles in the case of 
atomism (and bodies as aggregates), geometrical properties in the case of extended 
matter.  
 
The outcome was not simply a replacement of any of the received principles of 
individuation with a new principle of individuation, even though there were several 
such attempts in seventeenth century metaphysics. As has been described by Ariew, in 
the new philosophy the principle of individuation was transformed into a principle for 
dividing homogeneous actual matter into the individual parts that are the physical 
bodies of the new philosophy. Moreover, as we hope to show in what follows, in 
Descartes and Newton the problem of individuation undergoes a further crucial 
transformation, from a metaphysical issue tied to questions concerning the intrinsic 
nature of bodies, to a problem of how to generate the bodies that are to be the subject-
matter of the new physics. 
 
2. Descartes and the principle of individuation 
 
2.1 The current status of the debate 
 
Much has been said about Descartes’ attempts to provide a principle of individuation 
for the metaphysical foundations of his physics, or indeed for his physics. Various 
different authors, including Garber (1983, 1987, 1992), Woolhouse (1996), and 
Gaukroger (1999), have emphasised Descartes’ difficulties in finding a principle of 
individuation, and the consequences of this for Cartesian physics.5 The importance of 
the issue is vividly formulated by Garber in the following way: 
 
 “Everything in Descartes’ world must be explained in terms of bodies 
in motion. But motion itself is defined in terms of individual bodies. ... 
                                                                                                                                                                      
soul, unique and immortal, what is the place of the human body in this construction? Again, the 
principle of individuation needed re-examination. 
5 See also Thiel (1998); Grosholtz (1991), esp. p. 65-71; Ariew (1999); and Des Chene (1996), pp. 367-
382. We will address some of them in the following sections of the paper. 
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And so, it appears, the explanatory adequacy of Descartes’ physics 
depends upon making sense of the notion of an individual body.” 
(Garber, 1992, p. 175) 
 
In many respects, the modern-day debate mirrors that between Descartes’ 
contemporaries, and especially the criticisms made by Leibniz and Newton.6 As seen 
in Garber, one outcome of this trend of interpretation is that if Descartes fails to 
provide a principle of individuation then the basis of his physics, the theory of bodies 
in motion, lacks its very object (or, at best, deals with a very badly defined object). 
The attempt to individuate bodies by appeal to motion has received a great deal of 
attention in the recent literature, and there is widespread agreement that this attempt 
is, indeed, a failure (partly because of Descartes’ relational definition of motion, 
partly because of his theory of matter). There is, however, less agreement concerning 
the precise way in which Descartes attempted to reconstruct the physical world and 
the existence of individual bodies in it, and therefore concerning the causes of his 
failure. One reason for this is that, although there is a consensus that he fails to 
provide a principle of individuation, there remains a range of possibilities for 
understanding what is meant by a principle of individuation. We discuss what he 
himself said in the next section, but first some further remarks about the current 
literature on Descartes and the principle of individuation.  
 
A wide variety of issues come under discussion with respect to the principle of 
individuation. One group of issues is epistemological; for example, there are various 
epistemological possibilities for distinguishing between substances or between parts 
of matter (Garber, 1992; Principles, I.60; II.55). Others are metaphysical; for 
example, how can the existence of parts of matter be reconciled with the continuity 
postulate? Furthermore, if matter is no more than extension, if we have just one 
                                                          
6 There are three main points that recur: (i) matter is essentially passive; (ii) there is a circularity in the 
definitions of matter and motion; and (iii) a body can’t be kept track of once it starts moving. See 
Leibniz, Discours Metaphysique, in Woolhouse (1998) p. 12; or Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld, 30 April 
1687, also in Woolhouse (1998) p. 123; and Leibniz,  De ipse natura , in Leibniz, Oeuvres Choisis, Ed. 
L. Prenant, Paris, Garnier, s.a, p. 432; Newton (c.1684), and Garber (1992, 1983), Woolhouse (1996).  
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infinite and homogeneous "world", what is the basis for the division of this matter 
into parts capable of interacting with one another? These problems lead to questions 
concerning the objects that Descartes’ laws and rules of motion apply to. Recent 
papers by Dutton (1999), McLaughlin (1993), Hatfield (1998), as well as less recent 
ones by Garber (1983) and Blackwell (1996), for example, have even questioned the 
relevance of the laws of nature for the account of physical bodies, suggesting instead 
that the laws concern metaphysical issues of God’s interventions into the world7, the 
foundations of physics, and a holistic framework for cosmology. Contributors to the 
current debate can be divided (albeit rather crudely, and perhaps even somewhat 
unfairly) into two broad camps. One camp tends to eliminate from Descartes’ physics 
the very notion of individual bodies, interactions, forces or causes, and to subscribe to 
what we may label the occasionalist interpretation of Descartes8. The other camp is 
less homogeneous, but tends to insist on the existence of some means of individuation 
sufficient for the construction of “physical bodies”, albeit very different indeed from 
the physical bodies of our reality.9 
 
In what follows we will attempt to move the debate forwards by broadening the 
context in which it takes place. We will show how Descartes’ attempts to solve the 
problem of individuation relate to the issues we have labelled the “dissolution of 
bodies”, and then against this background we will trace his various attempts to 
reconstruct physical reality. This process sheds interesting new light on the 
consequences (both inside and outside his system of natural philosophy) of Descartes’ 
attempts to solve the problem of individuation . In particular, by showing how these 
two issues are related it becomes clear that the (alleged) failure to provide a principle 
of individuation drives Descartes towards an alternative and highly influential 
approach: the reconstruction of physical bodies through a model of individuation. In 
                                                          
7 Blackwell (1966), p. 223; Dutton, (1999), p. 57. 
8 Garber (1983); Garber et. al. (1998); Nadler (1993); etc. See for example the comments by Osler 
(1994) on the subject. 
9 There are various ways in which this can be done. See, for example, Gaukroger (2000) for a fluid-
model, Slowick (1996) for further suggestions concerning the idealization involved in Descartes’ 
reconstruction of bodies. 
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the context of the mechanical philosophy a principle of individuation gives necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the existence of an individual. In contrast, a model of 
individuation gives sufficient conditions for a part of matter, say, to be treated as if it 
is an individual with respect to some given purpose (doing physics, for example). 
 
 
2.2. Individuals and the real distinction  
 
The first way that Descartes addressed questions of individuation is common to 
seventeenth-century scholastic metaphysics10, as we see for example in the celebrated 
example of the piece of wax, where the issue of what counts as an individual is 
present (and pressing) in the background11. Descartes distinguishes between the two 
fundamental issues of, what we would call nowadays, individuation and identity over 
time. As in the traditional natural philosophy, he sees these as parts of the same 
question concerning the “essence” of an individual body (or mind).12 According to 
Descartes, identity over time is preserved by God’s action of conservation. However, 
individuality with respect to other substances, or parts of substances – indeed, the 
individuality with respect to all the rest of the world – is an issue which is not 
clarified by the second and third Meditations. All we can say at this point in the 
Meditations is that we are facing one of his main metaphysical difficulties: the general 
question “What makes a body an individual?”  
 
In addressing this question the starting point, and indeed the main point, is the 
definition of the real distinction. Here what is at stake is the essence of material 
reality, the essence of my own thinking substance, and the distinction between them. 
However, later in the Sixth Meditation, the real distinction is used in the context of 
Descartes’ explicit attempt to reconstruct physical reality. His purpose is to offer a 
criterion of physical existence of a strong type: everything I can clearly and distinctly 
                                                          
10 See especially Roger Ariew (1999, p. 152-3), and also Des Chene (1996). 
11 There are numerous authors who have been dealing with the issue. See for example Mijuskovic’s, 
(1991) discussion of the literature, esp. pp. 322-3. 
12 For discussion of theories of individuation by essence see Gracia (1984, p. 14-15). 
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perceive is capable of being created by God, therefore my intellect is offering me at 
least the possibility of the existence of the real world. Moreover, he writes:13 
 
“Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart 
from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, 
since they are capable of being separated, at least by God. The question of 
what kind of power is required to bring about such a separation does not 
affect the judgement that the two things are distinct.” 
 
As such, the real distinction bears upon the issues concerning the separation of 
substances, namely of mind and body (my mind and my body). In the second set of 
replies to the objections, in the section entitled Arguments proving the existence of 
God and the distinction between the soul and the body arranged in geometrical 
fashion Descartes clarifies the distinction he wants to set between body and mind 
through a set of definitions.  
 
“VI. The substance in which thought immediately resides is called mind.” 
“VII. The substance which is immediately the subject of local extension 
and of the accidents which presuppose extension, such as shape, position, 
local motion and so on, is called body.” 
 
Thus, body and mind are really distinct, as two substances. This time, the real 
distinction relates to a condition of existence:14 
 
“Two substances are said to be really distinct if each of them can exist 
apart from other.” 
                                                          
13 AT VII, 78. Passages concerning the real distinction can be found in several replies to the first, 
second and fourth set of objections. See, for example, AT VII, 120-121, 132, 162, and 220-221. See 
also the Principles, I.60, for a definition to be discussed in what follows. For discussions in the recent 
literature concerning the real distinction and its connection with the principle of individuation see, for 
example, Garber (1992) and Thiel (1998). 
14 AT VII, 162. 
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These definitions allow the formulation of a theorem stating the fact that there is a 
real distinction between body and mind. 
 
As we can see, the whole issue has relevance for the question of my own existence, 
essence and individuality. This thinking substance which is my mind can be separated 
from everything else, including other substances, such as body. Its individuality is 
given through its essence; its identity over time is granted by God recreating it in 
every instant.15 In such a way, Descartes is constructing the first isolated individual. 
The human individual is not an individual as such with respect to some other similar 
human mind or body, but with respect to God and the way in which we can conceive 
it distinct from whatever else can exist in the Universe and in direct relation with its 
creator. We can say that the model of individuation for the human being is that of an 
isolated individual soul, all alone in the Universe, facing only God who is preserving 
this state of isolation through time. 
 
At the same time, this definition of an isolated individual allows us to presume that 
there is something else in the world, essentially different and clearly distinct from it, 
namely something called body. This route towards a principle of individuation will 
not lead us too far, though. As some of Descartes’ critics pointed out, the real 
distinction may get us to the existence of “body”, as distinct from mind, but it does 
not get us to a multiplicity of bodies.16  In the light of this, the enlarged definition of 
the real distinction from the first part of the Principles of Philosophy is particularly 
interesting:17 
                                                          
15 Third Meditation, AT VII, 49. “For a lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each completely 
independent of the others, so that is does not follow from the fact that I existed a little while that I must 
exist now, unless there is some cause which as it were creates me afresh at this moment – that is, which 
preserves me.” 
16 See, for example, the Sixth set of Objections, AT VII, 417-18, which refers to the surface said to 
characterise and define a body, pointing out that this is not enough for a good definition. However, the 
comment on the objection postpones a judgement about physical objects “until they see whether you 
propose to demonstrate it in the treatise on physics which you promise us...”. 
17 Principles of Philosophy, I., 60. It is important to notice that Descartes is struggling here with 
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Real distinction properly exists between two or more substances: and we 
perceive these to be really distinct from one another from the sole fact that 
we can clearly and distinctly understand one without  the other. For, 
knowing God, we are certain that He can accomplish whatever we distinctly 
understand. For example, from the sole fact that we now have the idea of an 
extended or corporeal substance....we are now certain that it can exist; and 
that if it exists, each part of it {which can be} delimited by our mind is 
really distinct from other parts of the same substance. 
 
If we can clearly and distinctly perceive two substances, or two parts of the same 
substance, they are really distinct. The argument has several steps: firstly,  whatever 
we can understand clearly and distinctly as separated substances are really distinct; 
secondly, whatever we can separate in our intellect, God can create as separate 
objects, and, therefore, they can exist as separate objects.18  
 
It is quite clear that this represents the basis of a discussion of the problem of 
individuation19 in, as it were, traditional terms. Garber (1992), for example, offers an 
extensive discussion of it, together with further evidence from Descartes’ letters 
concerning the connection between the real distinction and the problem of 
individuation of physical bodies.20  His argument emphasises the difference between 
the argument for the existence of bodies in the Meditations (where bodies are said to 
affect my ‘passive faculty’ for sensing) and the Principles of Philosophy, where the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
different meanings of the concept of substance. Although in the proper sense of the term there are only 
two substances, the thinking and the extended, he seems to consider that “substance” applies, as in the 
traditional philosophy, to everything that can exist in and through itself. With this meaning he moved 
the discussion on the physical domain, talking about parts of matter (extension). 
18 Thiel (1998), pp. 224-5. 
19 Together with articles as II. 54 and 55. 
20 See, for example, the letter to Gibieuf, 19 January, 1642, quoted by Garber (1992), p. 175. 
Considering the two halves of a portion of matter, Descartes asserts that, providing there is a real 
distinction between them, we can see “the two halves of a portion of matter, however small it may be, 
as two complete substances”. 
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existence of external bodies is exclusively grounded in the principle of divine 
veracity.21  However, the main problem with Descartes’ proofs of the existence of 
bodies is that they are irrelevant for his own theory of matter.22  On the one hand, we 
cannot clearly and distinctly conceive of the parts of matter (due to the indefinite 
divisibility of matter, the plenum and the continuous motion of the material plenum). 
On the other hand, divisibility in thought is not enough for developing a theory of 
matter, where we seek to describe the evolution in time and the interactions of bodies 
(see p.10, below).  
 
It is worth pausing here to notice that the issue of the real distinction and its 
metaphysical counterpart - the fact that God guarantees the actual physical distinction 
between what he can separate and what we can conceive as really distinct - plays an 
important role in defining what the problem of individuation is, and this is for several 
reasons. First, Descartes’ definition of an individual does not imply criteria of 
distinguishing it from others of the same kind, but instead a criterion of distinguishing 
it according to its own ‘essence’, or essential properties. Secondly, in attempting to do 
this, Descartes marks the first step towards reconstructing the isolated individual, on 
the model developed in the metaphysical construction of the Ego in the Meditations, 
where the human individual is not defined with respect to his fellow humans (if any 
such humans exist), nor with respect to other minds or immaterial substances, but as a 
unique mind facing its creator, absolutely and essentially distinct from anything else, 
alone in the universe. Thirdly, for Descartes, finding a principle of individuation does 
not imply only a general criterion of separation, but also the very issue of the 
existence and “reality” of the physical world. Thus, the whole issue of the 
metaphysical reconstruction of the world is related to the complex of questions we 
have called the “dissolution of bodies”.  
 
If we now turn our attention to Descartes’ natural philosophy in his Principles of 
Philosophy, Part I (where the issues of substance and the real distinction are 
discussed) might be expected to provide the resources necessary for moving forward 
                                                          
21 Garber (1992), pp. 72-4. 
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to a discussion of physical bodies and their interactions. Instead, what we find at the 
beginning of Part II appears to be an acknowledgement of failure. The real distinction 
plus the argument based on divine veracity cannot do more than persuade us of the 
existence of:23  
 
a certain substance, extended in length, breadth and depth ... and it is this 
extended substance that we call body or matter. 
 
The divisibility of this substance is not enough to give us actual parts of matter, or 
bodies. Descartes needs to say in what way they are distinguished inside the 
continuum, both at an instant and over time.  In other words, from the point of view of 
doing physics, we don’t have the bodies we need, and the whole construction seems 
useless.  
 
 
3. Descartes’ model of individuation 
 
 
It has been pointed out by Garber (1992) and others24 that the first articles of Part II of 
the Principles deal with the individuation of physical bodies. Our claim is that this 
issue extends much further into Part II: all the articles up to and including those on the 
laws of nature can be systematically understood as a special kind of attempt to solve 
the problem of the dissolution of bodies. During this attempt, the problem of 
individuation changes: instead of bearing on the nature of bodies, it focusses on their 
existence and, moreover, on their existence as bodies suitable for the construction of a 
mechanical cosmology. What we are seeing here is a shift from matter theory as the 
basis of constructing a cosmology, to mechanics; matter theory is concerned with the 
nature of bodies (and thence their behaviour), whereas mechanics proceeds without 
                                                                                                                                                                      
22 Thiel (1998), p. 225. 
23 Principles, II. 1 
24 Thiel (1998), McLaughlin (1993). 
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commitment to the underlying nature of bodies.25  
 
Descartes begins with an appeal to the external surface of the bodies. This is a way of 
reducing the problem to a geometrical one, using ‘shapes and measures’ in a 
geometrical sense.  If a body is no more than a definite part of extension in motion, 
our only interaction with it is through its external surface.26 The surface of one of 
these shapes would be distinguishable from the others if, at least in principle, a 
‘measure’ could be associated with it;27 that is, we need a principle by which a 
number is associated to a geometrical figure28. 
 
It is interesting that Descartes starts with a thought experiment, proposing a model of 
physical bodies, or what we can call the “sponge-model” of a body. The whole point 
is to give an account of rarefaction-condensation in terms of the extension of a body 
conceived as a “sponge”, namely constructed from various pieces of different sizes 
between which there are a numbers of holes.29 Starting from this model, we can 
imagine a measure of the surface of the sponge - apparently including in it the 
measure of the holes - as an invariant with respect with the experiment of rarefaction 
and condensation. As a result, the extension, properly defined, can be viewed as the 
only essential property of a body and as its principle of individuation. A body is an 
individual through the measure associated to its surface. The problem is to specify this 
                                                          
25 See also, for example, Gaukroger (2001), p. 166. 
26 See the fourth set of replies, AT VII, p. 250-51, the sixth set of replies, AT VII, p. 417-18 etc. 
27 Principles of Philosophy, II.8. 
28 This idea that we should, in principle, be able to associate a number to a geometrical property or to a 
property as such is tremendously important not only for Descartes’ own construction but for the whole 
physics to come. Instead of talking about essences and nature, we can talk about coordinates and 
measures, and this is almost enough to distinguish one body from the rest. 
29 The issue at stake here bears upon a traditional controversial problem of natural philosophy: finding 
an explanation for the phenomena of rarefaction and condensation. Aristotelian philosophy failed to 
provide one. Atomistic explanations of rarefaction and condensation imply the existence of the void. 
Descartes is facing here the challenge of offering an alternative explanation, in terms of a new theory 
of matter, involving extension alone. See II.5, 6, and 7.  An interesting alternative explanation of 
rarefaction and condensation can be found in Charleton (1654) p. 17. 
 
13
principle precisely. It is clear from Descartes’ example that he does not mean by the 
measure the external surface of the body. The measure is more complicated than that, 
because it involves holes and also bits that are disconnected. The measure is equated 
with extension in II.8, but sometimes Descartes speaks of quantity (II.7).  
 
It is perhaps worth noticing that a similar solution is presented in a number of letters 
concerning the explanation of transubstantiation. There, the question of individuation 
is explicitly addressed, both with respect to the human body, and to physical bodies. 
For example, in Descartes’ letter to Mesland of 9 February 1645 the principle of 
individuation for physical bodies is said to be the number associated with the measure 
of the surface.30 In the reply to the fourth set of objections, which also concerns 
transubstantiation, Descartes constructs an extended account of what he means by 
surface (of the bread and wine involved in the consecration):31 
 
But we must note that our conception of the surface should not be based 
merely on the external shape of a body that is felt by our fingers; we 
should also consider all the tiny gaps that are found in between the 
particles of alcohol, water, vinegar and lees or tartar that are mixed 
together to form wine; and the same applies to the particles of other 
bodies. For, since these particles have various shapes and motions, they 
can never  be joined together, however tightly, without many spaces which 
are not empty but full of air or other matter....Hence the surface of the 
bread is not the area most closely marked out by the outline of an entire 
piece of bread, but is the surface immediately surrounding its individual 
parts.  
 
This is a very interesting direction of thought, unfortunately abandoned. In the 
published Principles, only the suggestion of the above model is kept for the 
                                                          
30 AT III, 161-72, see especially pp. 163-4, concerning the definition of the surface and the way in 
which physical bodies can be defined through the “superficie moyenne”, which is the boundary of the 
body and lies between the internal and external place. 
31 AT VII, 250-251. 
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explanation of the rarefaction/condensation experiment. Instead of pursuing the 
definition of surface and the way to associate a number to it, Descartes moves on to 
other attempts at solving the problem of individuation.32 
  
The next proposal is that matter might be individuated through motion33. Here 
Descartes states explicitly that what he is looking for is a metaphysical principle for 
dividing matter into parts: mere division in thought is not sufficient. He writes: 
 
If the division into parts occurs simply in our thought, there is no 
resulting change; any variation in matter or diversity in its many forms 
depends on motion. This seems to have been widely recognised by the 
philosophers, since they have stated that nature is the principle of 
motion and rest. And what they meant by ‘nature’ in this context is 
what causes all corporeal things to take on the characteristics of which 
we are aware in experience34. 
 
However, as is well known, the attempt to use motion to provide a solution to the 
problem of individuation for the parts of matter meets with an obvious and immediate 
difficulty, due to the fact that while attempting to individuate bodies by appeal to 
motion, Descartes simultaneously defines motion relationally by appeal to bodies.  
The result is a blatant circularity:35 
 
... we may say that motion is the transfer of one piece of matter, or one 
body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate contact 
with it, and which are regarded at being at rest, to the vicinity of other 
bodies. By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is 
transferred at a given time, even though this may in fact consist of many 
                                                          
32 The possibility of associating a measure to the external surface of the body is nevertheless important 
for the final reconstruction, and we should bear it in mind. 
33 Principles II.23 All the variety in matter, all the diversity of its forms depends on motion. 
34 Principles II.23; AT VIII, 53. 
35 Principles II. 25; AT VIII,54 
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parts which have different motions relative to each other. 
 
This circularity has been deemed by many commentators to be a fatal flaw in 
Descartes’ project of re-constructing the cosmos36. For our purposes, the consequence 
of the circle is clear: if motion and location are relational, they cannot by themselves 
serve as a means of individuating bodies. At best, something more must be added.37 
 
Most of the recent debates in the literature terminate at this point, stressing Descartes’ 
failure to offer a principle of individuation through motion.38 Despite this, the ensuing 
paragraphs of the Principles seem to deal with physical bodies and their properties: 
the very next step that Descartes makes is to talk about the cause of motion and the 
laws of nature as applying to bodies or parts of matter,39 as if the problem of the 
individuation at an instant has been solved. There are two possible interpretations: 
either Descartes believed that he had successfully provided a principle of 
individuation at an instant, or he opted to put to one side the approach of using a 
principle of individuation to generate bodies, and to take a new tack. On the latter 
interpretation, the remaining articles of Part II of the Principles are to be understood 
as an attempt to leave behind the quest for a principle of individuation as such, turning 
instead to the development of a model of individuation,40 whereby bodies are 
constructed and identified by associating numbers to certain properties. Which 
properties are relevant is determined by the physical theory needed to describe the 
                                                          
36 See for example Garber (1992) and Barbour (1989). 
37 There are other difficulties, too. For example, as Grosholz (1991), pp. 68-9, points out: “The 
definition of “one part of matter” allows for some very peculiar entities, since it does not require that 
the parts be contiguous, only that they share a common motion. A flock of particles dispersed over the 
whole solar system might count as one part of matter...”.  
38 Some commentators suggest that Descartes’ final solution is to search for something outside motion, 
in the ways in which God acts into the natural world. As a matter of fact, we are facing a tricky 
problem: given the identity over time, we would be able to use body’s extension and motion to define 
its individuality in an instant. But, as several of Descartes contemporaries and mostly Leibniz 
suggested, the individuation over time presupposes something other than extension.  
39 Note that Descartes appears to use the terms ‘parts of matter’ and ‘bodies’ interchangeably.  See in 
particular Principles II.25: “By one body, or one part of matter, I here understand…” 
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behaviour of those bodies. On this interpretation there are, according to Descartes, 
several such “numbers” encoding properties of bodies. The first may very well be 
extension, or the measure of the external surface of the body. Descartes’ move from 
this to the conclusion that there might be other properties of a body which can be 
expressed mathematically, having an associated measure, and that together these 
might specify a body adequately for the purposes of physics, is an important step in 
the history of physics. For, on this account, Descartes’ approach is strikingly modern: 
we see in embryonic form the concept of the state of a system, specified by numbers 
associated with each of the dynamically relevant properties of that system.  
 
 
Turning now to the details of what Descartes does when he introduces the laws of 
nature, we see that the concept of motion gets refined. The motion of bodies is 
characterised in terms of two very important components: the “quantity of motion”41 
and the determinatio42. They are two separate aspects of one and the same motion43. 
Both can be considered properties of any part of matter. Moreover, the first law of 
nature includes the quantity of motion in a more general concept, the concept of 
“state” of a body, and so we have significantly enriched the resources with which to 
divide matter into its parts. In this way, a body is characterised by: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
40 See section 2.1, final paragraph, above. 
41 The quantity of motion depends on “speed” and volume, but also on the way in which two bodies 
collide, and possibly on other factors too. See Principles II.43 and also, for example, Slowik (1996).  
42 Determinatio is in general considered to be the internal tendency to move in a straight line. It appears 
in the second law of nature, but also in other passages too. It is a key concept for understanding how 
motion is inherent in bodies, as Descartes argues. See Dioptrics, AT IV, pp. 94-5, Letter to Clerselier, 
17 February 1645, AT IV, p. 186. This distinction between the motion of a body and its determinatio is 
essential to Descartes’physics. Although this distinction does not explcitly appears in the laws, it is 
nevertheless present as, for example Garber (2001), p. 137 has shown. 
43 See for example The World, Chap. I, AT XI, pp. 8-9. “.. that the power to move and that which 
determines the direction in which the motion must take place, are two quite different things and can 
exist one without the other (as I have explained in the Dioptrics)..”. See also the letter to Mersenne, 21 
April 1641, AT 3, 355. 
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1.the “state”, a complex “device” which includes shape, size and motion, 
all of which Descartes has previously explored in connection 
with individuation.  
2.the determinatio which characterises the instantaneous tendency of a 
body to move in a straight line 
 
During the second part of his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes seems to imply that 
the addition of properties like measure, motion, quantity of motion and tendency to 
move in a straight line, provides the theory with sufficient resources to individuate a 
physical body. If this is the case, then it is very significant, because Descartes is 
individuating physical bodies without using a principle of individuation: we no longer 
have an instance of a general principle of individuation, applying to non-material 
entities as well as to parts of matter. Descartes has moved from attempting to provide 
a single all-encompassing metaphysical principle of individuation that can be applied 
to everything including matter, to a completely different strategy according to which 
he is trying to construct a model of material bodies that will provide him with a means 
of individuating them, but a means which is peculiar to material bodies. 
 
Meanwhile, providing means for distinguishing bodies at an instant is not enough. All 
the quantities associated with a body are instantaneous. Which leaves open the 
question of identity over time.  
 
What makes a body the same body at the next instant? Why can we still talk about the 
same body at a later instant of time? In the context of the problem of the dissolution 
of bodies and the need for a principle of individuation, it is natural to interpret the role 
of Descartes’ first law as being precisely to provide a means of individuating bodies 
over time. To see this, consider the first law in more detail. 
 
The laws receive their first formulation in The World (c1633)44, and the first law 
reads: 
                                                          
44 We extend our consideration to include The World because this helps to make clear Descartes’ strategy. 
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The first is that each individual part of matter continues always to be in the 
same state so long as collision with others does not force it to change that 
state. 
 
What we need now is an account of what it is to stay in the same state, of what it is to 
change state, and also of under what conditions change so defined can take place. 
Descartes continues as follows: 
 
That is to say, if the part has some size, it will never become smaller 
unless others divide it; if it is round or square, it will never change that 
shape unless others force it to; if it brought to rest in some place, it will 
never leave that place unless others drive it out; and if it has once begun to 
move, it will always continue with an equal force until others stop or 
retard it45. 
 
The first law and the discussion in the Principles of Philosophy is essentially the same 
as that in The World46. What we have is a conservation law applying to individual 
parts of matter, which states that each part of matter remains in the same state unless 
acted upon externally. The next step is to see how this connects with the problem of 
individuation. 
                                                          
45 Garber (1992) points out that although in The World and the Principles of Philosophy the law of 
conservation of quantity of motion is presented as a special case of the more general principle that a system 
will conserve its state unless acted upon externally, chronologically Descartes had the special case first and 
the general case appears for the first time in The World. 
46 “The first law of nature: that each thing, as far as is in its power, always remains in the same state...”. And 
then expanding: “The first of these laws is that each thing, provided it is simple and undivided, always 
remains in the same state as far as in its power, and never changes except by external causes.  Thus, if some 
part of matter is square, we are easily convinced that it will always remain square unless some external 
intervention changes its shape.  Similarly, if it is at rest, we do not believe that it will ever begin to move 
unless driven to do so by some external force.  Nor, if it is moving, is there any significant reason to think 
that it will ever cease to move of its own accord and without some other thing which impedes it.  We must 
therefore conclude that whatever is moving always continues to move as far as is in its power.” (Principles 
of Philosophy II.37) 
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We have seen that when he is addressing the problem of individuation at an instant, 
Descartes seems to end up achieving individuation by appeal to the state of a body, by 
ascribing numbers to specific properties of parts of matter. This method of 
individuation is repeated for individuation over time. Suppose we consider a part of 
matter that is not acted upon externally; specifying the state of that part of matter at a 
time is then sufficient to specify its state at the next instant, as guaranteed by the first 
law.47 Thus, if specifying the state of a body is sufficient for its individuation, the 
conservation law ensures that body persists through time and is available as an object 
of our knowledge.  
 
An important feature of Descartes’ model of individuation is that these two solutions 
can be added together. Even if each on its own fails, there remains the possibility of 
dividing up homogeneous matter in whatever way gives us parts by ascribing numbers 
to regions in such a way that the resulting ‘objects’ satisfy the laws of motion. These 
are the physical bodies. Although this is a circular solution to the problem of 
individuation it is not viciously circular.48 
 
The next step in Descartes’ project is to move from the consideration of an isolated 
individual body to an analysis of what would happen if a second body was added to 
the conceptual structure.  The eventual target is the indefinitely extended cosmos in 
which motion is constantly re-distributed in accordance with the general principle that 
the total quantity of motion in the universe is conserved. This is where the second law 
of The World comes in: 
 
I suppose as a second rule that when one body pushes another it cannot 
give the other any motion unless it loses as much of its own motion at the 
same time; nor can it take away any of the other’s motion unless its own is 
                                                          
47 Notice that the concept of an isolated individual, part of matter, or body, is fundamental to 
Descartes’ solution to the problem of individuating bodies.  Nevertheless, since Descartes’ cosmos is a 
plenum, there are in actuality no isolated individual bodies. 
48 See also Grosholz (1994), pp. 50-51. 
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increased by as much. 
 
The second law of The World is a law of conservation of the total quantity of motion 
of a composite system: it extends the first law from the single body case to the case of 
a pair of bodies, and provides us with a law for a composite system of colliding 
bodies considered as isolated from the rest of matter. However, this law is not always 
characterised in this way and some further discussion is useful49. 
 
The law is usually characterised as a law of impact, and as such is judged by its 
success at determining the outcome of collisions.  But this law is not sufficient to 
determine the outcome of a collision because it does not determine how the total 
quantity of motion will be distributed after the collision and it says nothing about the 
subsequent directions of the bodies50. The primary purpose of the collisions law is to 
generalise the first law for single bodies to the case of a pair of interacting bodies, so 
that we can individuate this composite system over time; and this it does successfully. 
However, the failure to determine the redistribution of the quantity of motion amongst 
the bodies following collision has the consequence that Descartes has no means of 
individuating the bodies that are the components of the composite system. Viewed 
from the point of view of the “dissolution of bodies” and the principle of 
individuation, this is the underlying problem that drives Descartes’ search for rules by 
which motion is redistributed and directions are altered during a collision. In the 
Principles, the law of collisions remains a conservation law for the composite system 
considered as an isolated system, but Descartes takes a new approach to the 
                                                          
49 Different people have treated different selections of the laws as unproblematically conservation laws.  For 
example, compare Garber (1992) and Gaukroger (1995).  Garber views the first law and the law of 
rectilinearity as principles of persistence, with the tendency of a body to move in a straight line at a being 
conserved along with the speed of the body.  But he finds it much more problematic to treat the law of 
impact as a conservation law.  Gaukroger, on the other hand, views both the first and second laws of The 
World as conservation laws, but he does not describe the third law, the law concerning rectilinearity, as a 
conservation law. 
50 Garber (1992), p. 231-2 writes, “At best the supposed law of impact is a special case of the conservation 
principle...” that is, the global conservation principle.  And hence, Garber concludes, “Descartes’ purported 
impact law in The World is, thus, no impact law at all.” 
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redistribution of motion in this law, and supplements the law with his rules of 
collision. Gabbey (1980) and Garber (1992) have argued that this version of the so-
called ‘impact law’ is best viewed not as a conservation law but as a law about 
collisions based on the idea that a collision is a contest between the two bodies51. A 
better interpretation, perhaps, is that the law remains a conservation law for the 
composite system as a whole, but the problem of redistribution is tackled in a new 
way in terms of a contest. Gaukroger (2000) has offered a distinct and powerful 
interpretation of the approach Descartes takes to the problem of redististribution, 
arguing that Descartes is using the model of statics, and in particular a balance, to 
work out the rules of collision.52 
 
Thus, Descartes’ first law and his collisions law can be interpreted as attempts to 
solve the problem of individuation of bodies over time, a problem that arises as a 
consequence of the “dissolution of physical bodies”. Furthermore, this solution 
involves appeal to the concepts of an isolated individual or system, and the state of 
that individual or system. However, at the end of Descartes’ construction these 
individuals are not what we might expect: there are no actual bodies53, subject to 
human experience, but instead highly abstract bodies, intelligible through their 
geometrical properties,54 and intended as the subject-matter from which theoretical 
physics and the construction of a cosmology should proceed.  
 
                                                          
51 He writes (p. 234-5), “... the impact law, law B of The World, appears as law 3 of the Principles of 
Philosophy, considerably changed from its initial statement.  The contest view, at best implicit in the earlier 
discussion, becomes the heart of the law, now clearly distinguished from the conservation principle...”. For 
more on this contest view of forces see Gueroult (1980).  
52 Thus, a lighter body will never raise a heavier body placed at an equal distance from the pivot point. The 
‘balance’ account is made even more convincing by the fact that Wren and Huygens both used balance 
analogies in their attempts to solve the problem of collisions (in response to the Royal Society 
challenge); see Radelet (2000). 
53 For an extended discussion on the notions of  materia, corpus, substantia  in the Principles see Des 
(1996), pp. 348-50.  
54 This is one of the main points of Garber’s demonstration in Garber (1992). See Sixth Meditation, AT  
VII, 80. 
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4. Newton and the problem of individuation  
 
The issue of whether Cartesian natural philosophy contains physical bodies is not a 
twentieth-century problem. Our purpose here is to show that Newton’s criticisms of 
Descartes’ natural philosophy originate in a reading of Part II of the Principles that is 
similar to the one argued for above. As we will see, Newton found Descartes’ discussion 
useful for his own concerns over individuation – his own approach is strongly Cartesian, 
both in its starting point and in much of its subsequent development.   
  
Newton was interested in issues concerning individuation and space from very early on. 
One of the Trinity notebook entries, bearing the title Of Space, reads: 55 
 
Extension is related to places as time to days, years etc. Place is the 
principium individuationis of straight lines, and of equal like figures; the 
surfaces of two bodies becoming but one where they are contiguous, because 
both in one place. 
 
In other words, we can see space as being introduced as a reply to the problem of 
individuation of physical bodies56. This same problem is addressed in the manuscript now 
referred to as ‘De Gravitatione’57, this being the locus classicus for Newton’s criticisms 
of Descartes58. In this context, Newton offers a significantly enriched solution to the 
                                                          
55 McGuire and Tamny (1986), p.351.  
56 This is by no means a peculiar way of answering the question concerning the individuation of bodies. 
We can find the same kind of approach in Charleton, for example (whose influence on Newton’s early 
writings has been emphasized by McGuire and Tamny, 1986). See Charleton (1654). 
57 See Hall and Hall (1962), pp. 89-156. For recent discussion of the importance of this manuscript, and 
its redating, see Cohen in Newton (2000), and also McGuire (2000), and Dobbs (1992). 
58 Much had been said, in recent years, about the extent of Descartes’ influence upon Newton. Little of 
it was acknowledged by Newton himself, who was always keen on distancing himself from, and 
criticising, Descartes. See McGuire and Tamny (1983); I.B. Cohen (1964); Bechler (1991). Most 
recently, Scott Mandelbrote wrote: “His first, great master was Rene Descartes and he only emerged 
from the Frenchman’s shadow once he was past his fortieth birthday.”, in Mandelbrote (2001), p. 10. 
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problem of individuation. Newton starts from Descartes’ question of how to reconstruct 
an appropriate concept of individual bodies, and from the fundamental premise that we 
don’t know – and we are not even interested in59 – the ‘real’ nature of a physical body:60  
 
Moreover, since body is here proposed for investigation not in so far as it is a 
physical substance endowed with sensible qualities but only so far as it is 
extended, mobile and impenetrable...I have postulated only the properties 
required for local motion. 
 
However, although we may not know what the nature of bodies is61, we have a way of 
defining them as individuals through their properties, which are shape, impenetrability, 
motion and the capacity of affecting our senses62. The extended discussion that follows of 
physical bodies and their relationship to absolute space shows Newton facing the problem 
of the dissolution of bodies and proposing an alternative solution to Descartes’. 
According to Newton’s argument in ‘De Gravitatione’, whatever the nature of body, we 
can understand bodies as solidified shapes created by God in absolute space, and moved 
around in absolute space according to certain laws. What individuates a body, on this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The cristicisms in ‘De Gravitatione’ are usually understood as being directed at Descartes’ theory of 
motion. While this is undoubtedly true, it is also the case that Newton is concerned with Descartes’ 
account of body – see, for example, p. 126 “the fundamental definition of motion errs, therefore, that 
attributes to bodies that which only belongs to surfaces”.  
59 See also statements like: “...it seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning from’d Matter in 
solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with other 
Properties and in such Proportion to Space, as most conduced to the End for which he from’d them” 
Opticks, p. 400. In other words, the inner nature, the metaphysical status and the “purpose” of bodies 
lies beyond the boundaries of “sound” natural philosophy, and bears upon finalists and theological 
questions.  
60 Hall and Hall (1962), p. 122. 
61  The nature of explanation concerning bodies is different from that concerning space or geometry 
because bodies “does not exist necesarily but by divine will”. Hall and Hall (1962), p. 138.  The next 
passage reads: “hence, I am reluctant to say positively what the nature of bodies is, but I rather describe 
a certain kind of being similar in every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny to be within 
the power of God, so we can hardly say that it is not body.” 
62 Hall and Hall (1962), p. 139-140. It is very intersting that one of the main properties for something to 
be a physical body is an “active faculty” through which it can affect my senses. 
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account, is its position in absolute space: the individuation of bodies is parasitic upon the 
individuation of the points of absolute space. This is Newton’s “string model” of 
individuation. By analogy with time or with mathematical strings of numbers, the points 
of space are individuated by their positions in a regular structure:63 
 
For just as the parts of duration derive their individuality from their order, so 
that  (for example) if yesterday could change places with today and become 
the later of the two, it would lose its individuality and would no longer be 
yesterday but today; so, the parts of space derive their characters from their 
positions; so that if any two could change their positions, they would change 
their character at the same time, and each would be converted numerically 
into the other. The parts of duration and space are only understood to be the 
same as they really are because of their mutual order and position; nor do they 
have any hint of individuality apart from that order and position which 
consequently cannot be altered.64 
 
The same ordering principle can be found in the Principia:  the order of parts of space 
and time is said to be immutable, the parts maintain the same position "from infinity to 
infinity”65. 
 
As the order of the parts of time is immutable, so also is the order of the parts 
of space. Suppose those parts to be moved out of their places, and they will be 
moved (if the expression may be allowed) out of themselves. For times and 
spaces are, as it were, the places as well of themselves as of all other things. 
All things are placed in time as to order of succession; and in space as to 
                                                          
63 See for example McGuire and Tamny (1986) p.343 (389r): “To help the conception of the nature of these 
leasts, how they are indivisible, how extended, of what figure etc., I shall all along draw a similitude from 
numbers, comparing mathematical points to ciphers, indivisible extension to units, divisibility or compound 
quantity to number, i.e. a multitude of atoms to a multitude of units.” The same model is offered in ‘De 
Gravitatione’ for parts of space. 
64 ‘De Gravitatione’, in Hall and Hall (1962), p. 136. 
65 Scholium to the Definitions, Principia, Newton (1934), p. 9: “Now no other places are immovable 
but these that, from infinity to infinity, do all retain the same given position on one another; and upon 
this account must ever remain unmoved; and do thereby constitute the immovable space.” 
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order of situation. It is from their essence or nature that they are places; and 
that the primary places of things should be movable, is absurd. These are 
therefore the absolute places; and translations out of those places, are the only 
absolute motions66. 
 
In both ‘De Gravitatione’ and the Principia, bodies are individuals because of their 
different positions in absolute space. Space contains all the mathematical shapes in an 
actual way, and God solidifies these shapes out of space, making them sensible67. 
 
The appeal to the sensible properties of bodies is an important difference between 
Newton and Descartes.68 If shape, mobility and the “place” in space are properties 
suitable for a mathematical description in a Cartesian way, the capacity of affecting 
our senses – the active power of bodies to impress upon my perception – is a very 
different type of quality. How can it be quantified or represented in any way? How 
can I recognize that a body which is affecting my perception now is the same body 
which was affecting my senses a minute earlier? 
 
So, although the problem of individuation at an instant is solved, there is still a question 
of identity over time. What makes a body the same body at the next instant of time? The 
initial position in ‘De Gravitatione’ is similar to Descartes’: God conserves the “shape”, 
re-creating or moving the bodies around while preserving their “formal nature”. Despite 
the later attempt to replace this approach with an appeal to the arrangements of the 
particles69 (a line of thought that gets into considerable difficulty due to the fact that we 
                                                          
66 Scholium to the Definitions, Principia, Newton (1934), p. 8. 
67 ‘De Gravitatione’, in Hall and Hall (1962), p.139: “Thus we may imagine that there are empty spaces 
scattered through the world, one of which, defined by certain limits, happens by divine power to be 
impervious to bodies, and ex hypothesi it is manifest the this would resist the motions of bodies and 
perhaps reflect them, and assume all the properties of a corporeal particle, except that it will be 
motionless”. And also, a body "is nothing more than the product of divine mind realised in a definite 
quantity of space” . 
68 Note that there is a difference between Descartes’ Principles (read by Newton) and his Meditations – 
in the latter, bodies are capable of affecting my senses.  
69 Opticks, 394. 
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do not know what the forces that preserve the bodies are), in the end Newton is unable to 
escape Descartes’ solution to this problem, and he is forced to reintroduce conservation 
laws.  
 
In manuscript IIe, dated by Herivel at around 1665/6, Newton states: 
 
Ax. 100.  Every thing doth naturally persevere in that state in which it is 
unless it bee interupted by some externall cause, hence axiome 1st and 2d and 
[2?] A body once moved will always keepe the same celerity, quantity and 
determination of its motion.70 
 
Here, Newton has conceptually united the first two laws of Descartes’ Principles71. As 
with Descartes, conservation of linear motion is derived from a more general 
conservation principle; that is, from the more general claim that a body will conserve its 
state unless acted upon externally. So, what was eventually Newton’s first law applies to 
isolated bodies and is derived from a general conservation principle for such bodies. 
Given an isolated individual body at some instant, what makes this body the same body as 
a later instant is that it has conserved its state. As for Descartes, the concepts of isolated 
individuals and the state of an individual are crucial to solving the problem of 
individuating bodies over time. What makes this interpretation of the genesis of Newton’s 
first law in the problem of individuation plausible is the context: Descartes was clearly 
concerned with this problem in Part II of his Principles; Newton read Descartes’ 
Principles, and in ‘De Gravitatione’ he is clearly starting from Cartesian problems, 
including the problem of individuation.  
 
The similarity does not end here. Newton also follows Descartes’ strategy of attempting 
to generalise his law of conservation of quantity of motion from a single body to a pair of 
                                                          
70 The first and second axioms are: “1. If a quantity once move it will never rest unlesse hindered by 
some externall caus.  2. A quantity will always move on in the same streight line (not changing the 
determination nor celerity of its motion) unlesse some externall cause divert it.” These are the first two 
laws of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, but with the consideration of rest removed, and Newton 
has yet to combine them into a single law. 
71 We leave aside here discussion of the development of Newton’s concept of mass. 
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interacting bodies. In Newton, the process of generalization to composite isolated systems 
becomes more sophisticated, as we will see in a moment. The central point, however, is 
this: although the problem of individuation does not show itself in its “traditional” form 
on the face of Newtonian mechanics, three of the most important concepts of Newtonian 
mechanics - the isolated individual body/system, the state of a body/system, and 
conservation laws applying to isolated bodies/systems - emerged directly out of the 
problem of individuation.  
 
5. Newton’s Laws and Composite Systems 
 
 
How does Newton progress from the motion of a single isolated body to the behaviour of 
interacting bodies? His general strategy in the Principia is exactly that found in 
Descartes: we proceed by construction from the behaviour of isolated individuals to the 
behaviour of composite systems via conservation laws, but in Newton the strategy is 
implemented with dramatically greater success.  
 
From the beginning of his consideration of individual bodies, Newton is interested in 
saying precisely how the state of a body changes as a result of a collision. Newton’s 
second law tells us in what way a body’s state will be changed by the action of an 
external force, and, crucially, this change is quantifiable. It is the third law, however, 
that allows Newton to extend his analysis to the behaviour of bodies interacting with 
one another. Newton succeeds in providing a rule which determines uniquely and 
quantifiably the outcome of collisions and interactions between bodies.  
 
The role of the third law is to determine the behaviour of the component bodies of a 
system, behaviour that must be consistent with the first law continuing to hold for the 
composite interacting system as a whole.  This is perhaps most clearly seen by looking at 
corollaries III and IV to the laws of motion in Newton’s Principia, and at Newton’s 
treatment of planetary motion.72  In this way, we see that the new cosmology is built from 
                                                          
72 A case for this view of the role of the third law can also be made by considering the historical process by 
which Newton came to his third law.  As Westfall (1971), pp. 344-7, discusses, it is in Newton’s attempt to 
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isolated subsystems which preserve their state unless acted upon by a force, by means of 
conservation principles. 
 
We begin by considering the way in which Newton solved the problems that Descartes 
had with extending his laws to composite interacting systems.  We have seen that 
Descartes sought to extend his discussion of single bodies to a consideration of 
interacting bodies by means of a conservation law applying to the composite system as a 
whole.  However, this conservation law is insufficient to determine the outcome of a 
collision between two bodies, since it does not determine the distribution of the total 
quantity of motion between the two bodies after the collision, and nor does it say anything 
about the direction in which the bodies move off after the collision.  With respect to the 
first issue, Descartes leaves us with the following question concerning the generalisation 
of his laws to composite systems: 
 
By what rule is the total quantity of motion redistributed in an impact between two 
bodies? 
 
With respect to the second issue, we note that although Descartes extended his 
conservation of quantity of motion from the single body case to the composite system 
case, he did not extend his conservation of direction of motion from the single body case 
to the composite system case.  This extension was also needed in order to solve the 
problem of what happens when two bodies collide. 
 
By means of the Third Law, Newton achieves an answer to the distribution question and 
an extension of the conservation of the linearity of motion from single bodies to 
composite systems.73 
                                                                                                                                                                      
solve the problem of collisions that he develops his concept of force.  In this way we get (a) a measure of the 
external cause of changes of motion of a body, and (b) the separation of the concept of force from the 
concept of quantity of motion, and so from Descartes’ law of conservation of motion for colliding bodies, 
giving us Newton’s third law as the underpinning of the redistribution of the total quantity of motion (where 
quantity of motion is now the vector quantity momentum) in a collision, such that momentum is conserved. 
73 The genesis of this solution can be traced in the way Newton’s laws develop through earlier manuscripts 
to their final incarnation in the Principia.  For discussion of the development of the laws see especially 
Westfall (1971) p. 439ff and Herivel (1965). 
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Corollary III contains the first use of the Third Law in the Principia.  Newton uses the 
Third Law to demonstrate that the total quantity of motion before and after a collision 
between two bodies is conserved.  He is demonstrating Descartes’ law of conservation of 
motion for two colliding bodies, but he is also doing more than this.  For Newton, 
quantity of motion is not Descartes’ scalar notion but rather the vectorial concept, 
momentum.  Unlike Descartes’ concept, this concept in conjunction with the Third Law 
allows us to go beyond the claim that the total quantity of motion is conserved to the 
redistribution of the total quantity of motion, both in terms of the magnitude of the 
momentum and in terms of the direction of the motion.  We have a quantified solution to 
the distribution problem, and an extension of the conservation of linearity of motion from 
single bodies to pairs of colliding bodies.  
 
So much for solving this problem. We now consider Newton’s own constructional 
strategy for composite systems.  In Corollary IV Newton shows that redistribution of 
motion in interactions by means of the Third Law is consistent with the First Law holding 
for a composite system treated as a single body via the centre-of-mass of the system.74 
The structure of Newton’s argument is to build up from the behaviour of a set of mutually 
isolated bodies, via a pair of interacting bodies, to a many-bodies system of interacting 
bodies.  In detail, Newton begins with a set of bodies each of which is freely moving and 
straightforwardly argues that:  
 
the common centre of gravity of them all is either at rest or moves uniformly 
in a right line.75 
 
Then, he considers an isolated system of two interacting bodies.  By the Second and Third 
Laws, any change in the momentum of one body will be accompanied by an equal and 
                                                          
74 Again, there is a long history to this discussion in the Principia which can be found in Newton’s 
manuscripts.  For discussion of this history see Herivel (1965). 
75 Newton, Principia, (1962 edition), p. 19. 
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opposite change in the momentum of the other, and hence the centre-of-mass of the two-
body system remains at rest or in uniform motion.76  
 
Next, he adds to this pair of interacting bodies the remainder of the set of mutually 
isolated bodies with which he began.  Combining the above results for the set of non-
interacting bodies and the pair of interacting bodies, he concludes that the motion of the 
centre-of-mass of the combination will be unaffected by the interaction of the pair. 
 
Finally, we need to extend this to composite systems in which three or more bodies are 
interacting.  Newton says: 
 
But in such a system all the actions of the bodies among themselves either 
happen between two bodies, or are composed of actions interchanged between 
some two bodies.77 
 
and from here he concludes that 
 
therefore they never do produce any alteration in the common centre of all as 
to its state of motion or rest ... And therefore the same law takes place in a 
system consisting of many bodies as in one single body, with regard to their 
persevering in their state of motion or of rest.78 
 
Conservation of linear momentum is shown to hold for a composite isolated system of 
interacting bodies via redistribution of motion according to the third law, and the method 
is to generalise by construction from a single isolated body to a composite isolated 
system.   
 
                                                          
76 Or, as Newton writes, “Therefore since the changes which happen to motions are equal and directed to 
contrary parts, the common centre of those bodies, by their mutual action between themselves, is neither 
accelerated nor retarded, nor suffers any change as to its state of motion or rest.” (Ibid, p. 19) 
77 Ibid, p. 20. 
78 Ibid, p. 20. 
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6. Newton’s constructional strategy in practice 
 
This method of building the cosmos is put into practice in Newton’s discussion of 
planetary motion.79  For example, in discussing the motion of the satellites of planets80 
Newton writes that they will move around their planet but that this motion will be 
disturbed from a perfect ellipse by the influence of the Sun.  We can construct the actual 
motion of a planetary satellite by beginning from a consideration of the satellite plus its 
planet as a two-body composite system isolated from all other influences.81 
 
Newton then goes on to describe the way in which the Moon deviates from an elliptical 
orbit of the Earth, and in Proposition XXV of Book 3 he shows how to “find the forces by 
which the sun disturbs the motions of the moon” by considering a system consisting of 
the Moon and Earth only, and then analysing the actual motion of the moon as a deviation 
from this idealisation. 
 
We end by noting one final feature of this constructional strategy. We have seen that 
according to Newton the behaviour of the three-body system can be analyzed in terms 
of how the two-body system would have behaved plus a disturbing factor.  In other 
words, the interaction between the Sun and the Earth is completely blind to whether 
or not the Moon is present.  The overall behaviour of the Earth results from its own 
behaviour as an isolated system, plus the contribution arising from its interaction with 
the Sun, plus the contribution from its interaction with the Moon, and so forth, and 
each of these contributions is completely unaffected by whether or not the other 
contributions are present.  In this way, we can proceed to re-construct the entire 
universe, adding one body at a time, and nothing that we add will ever require us to 
go back and recalculate how the Sun and the Earth interact. 
                                                          
79 I. B. Cohen (1980) discusses this process in detail, and he attributes to the third law the role of allowing 
Newton to move from consideration of the motion of a single planet about a fixed centre of force, to a pair of 
interacting planets, to a many-bodies interacting system, thereby constructing the motions of the planets in 
the manner we have described.  See in particular p. 44. 
80 Newton, Principia,  Book 3, Proposition XXII, Theorem XVIII. 
81 “But then their motions will be in several ways disturbed by the action of the sun, and they will suffer 
such inequalities as are observed in our moon.” 
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In conclusion, then, at the heart of the Newtonian cosmos of the Principia lies Newton's 
solution to Descartes' problem of the individuation of material bodies, many crucial 
aspects of which (taking isolated individual bodies as the starting point, the concept of the 
state of the body specified numerically and without appeal to the ‘underlying nature of 
matter’, conservation laws, and the constructional strategy) are found also in Descartes' 
own solution. 
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